Publications

As computing power becomes central to geopolitical rivalry, cloud infrastructure is increasingly framed as critical to national security, economic resilience and technological sovereignty. Current debates often focus on global competition – especially between the U.S. and China – highlighting strategic investments, export controls and infrastructure diplomacy abroad. Yet far less attention has been paid to the domestic territorial transformations that make such geopolitical projection possible. This paper argues that national strategies for AI and cloud dominance depend on the reorganization of land, energy and regulatory systems to sustain large-scale computation. Using a geopolitical ecology framework, we examine how the U.S. and China build national computing power as a strategic economic and military resource. In the U.S., cloud firms operate as state-aligned actors, drawing on fragmented regulatory authority, public subsidies and national security discourse to expand into rural and peri-urban regions. China pursues a more centralized strategy through its East Data, West Computing initiative, redistributing infrastructure to inland provinces under state-led development goals. Through comparative regional analysis, we show how domestic infrastructural expansion underpins geopolitical rivalry, producing new forms of territorial governance and socio-environmental inequality. Far from immaterial, the cloud is grounded in enclosure, extraction and the spatial foundations of techno-industrial power.

Despite the rising number of green finance policies, the socioeconomic determinants shaping them remain largely unexamined. Drawing from the literature analysing the relationship between regulation, market development and institutional economics, we contend that green finance policy adoption is driven by both market-based and institutional factors. Using a survival analysis approach to understand the levers influencing green finance policy adoption across 188 countries from 2000 to 2019, we find that exposure to the fossil fuel industry predominantly drives the initial issuance of green finance policies. The positive effect of fossil fuel commercial financing on the adoption of green finance policies exists in countries with high and medium climate change awareness levels. Meanwhile, in countries with a low climate change awareness level, fossil fuel government subsidies drive green finance policy adoption. Our study also highlights the role of the financial industry as one of the key actors in the policy cycle of green finance policies via two pathways: (i) affecting financial stability through financing oil and gas companies on primary financial markets and (ii) developing a market for sustainable finance products.

In Singapore, most land is state-owned, with the state generally issuing leasehold estates via state leases of not more than 99 years , depending on the intended land use. Naturally, the value of a leasehold estate, which erodes over time as the lease approaches the end of its term, is a key component of the premium charged for lease renewals, or the tax imposed for permission given in relation to a development that would increase the value of the land. By law, the state valuation of leasehold land is prescribed by a leasehold relativity table colloquially known as ‘Bala’s Curve’ or ‘Bala’s Table’. Since its adoption in 1948, however, the underlying assumptions and discount rate inherent to the curve have not been disclosed. This paper aims to deconstruct or reverse engineer Bala’s Table to derive the best fit model of the curve. Doing so allows policymakers to evaluate whether the model parameters align with prevailing economic realities, and if not, modify them to reflect the market and more accurately value leasehold estates for calculating taxes and premiums.
 

This study adds to the growing literature on mobile platforms by examining the performance of the Singapore MaRTy (SMaRTy) in conducting mobile micrometeorological measurements along a designated route in an urban park in Singapore, reflecting a pedestrian walking experience. The main objective of the study was to calculate the sensor lag for the mobile climate measurements: Air Temperature (TA), and Relative Humidity (RH) of SMaRTy along a designated route in an urban park in Singapore based on data from fixed stations (HOBO sensors) in two significant synoptic meteorological periods during the Northeast and Southwest monsoons. Statistically significant regression models were obtained for the two study periods. For the TA, the regression models for the Southwest monsoon yielded higher R2 (0.85–0.99) and lower Root Mean Square Error (RMSE) (0.34–0.57) than those for the Northeast monsoon (R2: 0.09–0.90, and RMSE: 0.53–0.71). However, diurnal variations in cloud cover affected the regression models of SMaRTy, with more cloudy conditions resulting in weaker correlations. Overall, results suggest that mobile climate measurements via SMaRTy along a designated route, when corrected for lag, yield accurate data that can be applied toward urban climate analysis.

By examining China’s refugee policies from 1949 to 1982, this article demonstrates how the Chinese state redefined “return” and “refugee” to serve shifting political objectives. While China is often perceived as a source, rather than a host, of asylum seekers, it hosted over 320,000 displaced migrants—primarily ethnic Chinese from Southeast Asia—during the Cold War. Through a systematic discourse analysis of 382 People’s Daily articles, we identify four state narratives—diaspora, diplomatic tool, ideological sanctuary, and legal duty—that structured how China labeled displaced migrants, interpreted their sentiments, and determined their settlement. These models evolved dynamically: from the 1950s to the late 1970s, China framed displaced migrants as both diasporic returnees and victims of foreign persecution to bolster its legitimacy. During the Cultural Revolution, they were recast as Maoist returnees seeking ideological redemption. By 1978, the state invoked international legal norms by portraying them as “refugees” to secure global assistance amid the Indochinese refugee crisis. We argue that China’s refugee discourse functioned as a flexible political instrument that unsettled rigid distinctions between voluntary and forced migration. Our findings advance a constructivist understanding of migration categories and offer a historically grounded critique of refugee politics beyond Western-centric Cold War narratives.

This paper studies integrating the crowd workforce into next-day home delivery services. In this setting, both crowd drivers and contract drivers collaborate in making deliveries. Crowd drivers have limited capacity and can choose not to deliver if the presented tasks do not align with their preferences. The central question addressed is: How can the platform minimize the total task fulfilment cost, which includes payouts to crowd drivers and additional payouts to contract drivers for delivering the unselected tasks by customizing task displays to crowd drivers? To tackle this problem, we formulate it as a finite-horizon Stochastic Decision Problem, capturing crowd drivers’ utility-driven task preferences, with the option of not choosing a task based on the displayed options. An inherent challenge is approximating the non-constant marginal cost of serving orders not chosen by crowd drivers, which are then assigned to contract drivers. We address this by leveraging a common approximation technique, dividing the service region into zones. Furthermore, we devise a stochastic look-ahead strategy that tackles the curse of dimensionality issues arising in dynamic task display execution and a non-linear (problem specifically concave) boundary condition associated with the cost of hiring contract drivers. In experiments inspired by Singapore’s geography, we demonstrate that choice-based crowd shipping can reduce next-day delivery fulfilment costs by up to 16.9%. The observed cost savings are closely tied to the task display policies and the task choice behaviours of drivers.

Many cities experience urban overheating from climate change and the urban heat island phenomenon. Previous studies demonstrate that parks are a potential nature-based solution to mitigate urban overheating through the ‘Park Cool Island’ (PCI) effect. PCI intensity can be measured through field measurements (FM) or remote sensing. This FM study used a network of meteorological sensors within a park and in its surrounding urban area to ascertain its PCI intensity in Singapore from January to December 2022. Consistently cooler air temperatures were found throughout a 24-h period in the park area, with mean daytime (nighttime) PCI intensity measured ~ 2.21 °C (~ 1.69 °C). A modified version of PCI (PCImodified) was developed to highlight the radiative cooling differences between the urban and park areas. PCImodified leverages on the network of sensors to preserve the spatial granularity of data, allowing for the interpolation of point data across the study area. By employing Geographical Information Science concepts, the model visualises the diurnal changes in PCImodified intensities with respect to tree height, tree density, and building height; significant cooling is positively (negatively) correlated with tree height and density (building height). This study demonstrates a comprehensive analysis of PCI and cooling intensities of parks using FM in understudied tropical urban environments.
 

Cities have long been expressions of political ideology in China and elsewhere. During China’s rapid urbanization over the past few decades, “new areas” became popular strategies to promote urban growth, following the success of Shenzhen, widely regarded as China’s first special economic zone. Today under Xi, Xiong’an New Area has become the latest “new area of national significance.” But unlike previous new areas in China, Xiong’an has become wedded to a distinct vision of the urban in Xi Jinping’s China, one in which the excesses of reform-era urbanization are controlled through new forms of affordable housing and finance, new ecological planning approaches and digitized government services. Through an analysis of the rhetoric and ideas used to promote the city, gleaned from archival analysis and financial data, this article shows how Xiong’an has become a showcase for a new ideology of the urban under Xi Jinping.

In recent years, China has pivoted towards a global leadership role in mitigating and adapting to climate change. Notwithstanding the complex political economic reasons underlying China's global leadership aspirations, we are interested in seeing whether the associated national discourse championed by the state increases domestic support for climate policy. That is, do China's international leadership aspirations foster a unifying sense of national pride among the domestic population, thereby lending support to the legitimacy of the state and expediting the implementation of costly domestic climate policies? To test our hypothesis, we enumerated a vignette experiment embedded with conjoint analysis to a nationally representative sample (n = 4788). We found no evidence that exposure to China's global leadership aspirations increased domestic support for national-level climate policy, as proxied by a carbon tax. Indeed, we found that exposure to China's global climate leadership aspirations decreased domestic support for a carbon tax under certain scenarios. Our findings demonstrate a potential disconnect between global and local climate policy discourses and suggest that China's policymakers need to exercise caution in ensuring that their global climate leadership aspirations do not come at the expense of decreased domestic support for the national-level policies required to meet China's goal of carbon neutrality by 2060.
 

The idea of right-sizing, or the process of adjusting the size of a city to maximise the efficient use of resources, has traditionally been used in strategic management and the resizing of shrinking cities to promote efficient urban development. Concurrently, in contemporary discourse, the sizing of smart cities has emerged as a critical topic, as size impacts the implementation of smart initiatives. Smaller cities offer the advantage of serving as cost- effective testing grounds for innovative solutions; however, they also need to be sizeable enough to attract private investments and build a robust smart city ecosystem. In this paper we demonstrate how in the context of smart city planning and governance in Southeast Asia, different actors are adopting new spatial strategies to address the sizing question. The idea of right-sizing requires rethinking in the context of smart city because it captures how effectively cities are scaled to balance technological innovations with socio-economic and administrative demands. Through three case studies from Southeast Asia, we analyse three distinct smart city right-sizing strategies: dispersal, zoning, and merging. By examining these, the paper highlights the complexities and nuances in determining the right size of a smart city across discrete contexts.